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Abstract
We investigate the concepts of past, present, and future that build
upon a modal distinction between the settled past and the open future.
The concepts are defined in terms of a pre-causal ordering and of
qualitative differences between alternative histories. Finally, we look
what an event’s past, present, and future look like in the so-called
Minkowskian Branching Structures, in which histories are isomorphic
to Minkowski spacetime.
“What is the present?”1 We typically understand this question as being
relative to events, that is, we fix our attention on some event (frequently,
an event of our utterance) and query what the present of this event is. The
question has many facets, two of which we have set apart for the purposes of
this paper. First, we may be concerned with when the “now” is, or what a
locus for “now” is. The aim is to indicate a part of our world, or a region of
spacetime, as a locus for the present of an arbitrary event. In other words, the
aim is to define the set of events co-present (contemporaneous) with a given
one, or the set of locations of such events. Secondly, one may wonder what
differentiates the present of an event from its past and its future. This second
question quickly leads us to considerable metaphysical queries: “Is becoming
real?”, or “Is the distinction between tenses objective or mind-dependent?”.
Clearly, the second question is much harder; moreover, a positive answer to
it presupposes some answer to the first question. So we put it aside, and
focus upon what a locus for “now” is.
The problem is that starting with the papers of Rietdijk (1966) and Put-
nam (1967), there have been arguments showing that special relativity (SR)
is inimical to any intuitive notion of the present, where “intuitive” here means
that it is based on co-presence that is transitive and neither the identity nor
the universal relation on Minkowski spacetime.2 Although these arguments
deserve a separate analysis, to keep the length of this paper short, we will
limit ourselves to this not-so–rigorous formulation of the result:
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R The following set of premises is logically incoherent:
(1) the relations used to define co-presence and co-presence itself are
invariant with respect to automorphisms of Minkowski space-time,
(2) co-presence is a transitive relation on Minkowski spacetime,
(3) of two co-present events, one cannot be causally before (or after)
the other, and
(4) co-presence is neither the identity nor the universal relation on
Minkowski spacetime.
Attempts to blunt the impact of this result boil down to arguing that a failure
of one of premises (1) - (4) is not as bad as it looks.3
In this paper, motivated by an intuition that associates the future with
contingency, we construct a spatiotemporally extended and frame-independent
notion of the present. The construction does not contradict result R (how
could it?): to accommodate contingency, we will distinguish a special set
of points of Minkowski spacetime, called splitting points, and thought of as
locations of chancy events. To define the present, we will use relations like
“x is a splitting point and y lies within the future-light cone of x”, which
clearly is not invariant with respect to automorphisms of Minkowski space-
time. Moreover, we will end up with a notion of tenses that will be separate
from causal notions defined in terms of light-cones. The approach is intended
to be conciliatory: on the one hand, we invite the reader to modify her notion
of the present. On the other, we take it that neither special relativity nor
general relativity are our ultimate truths, so perhaps one day there will be
a theory of both spacetime and chanciness. Needless to say, we bet on our
world turning out to be chancy.4
1 Main intuition
There is a strand in philosophy that associates the future with open possibili-
ties, the past with settled facts, and the present with a region of passage from
possibility to settledness. The view had a strong proponent in Aristotle.5 In
recent times, the idea was defended by Whitrow (1961, pp. 295–296):
Strict causality would mean that the consequences pre-exist in
the premises. But, if the future history of the universe pre-exists
logically in the present, why it is not already in the present? If, for
the strict determinist, the future is merely “the hidden present”,
whence comes the illusion of temporal succession? The fact of
transition and ‘becoming’ compels us to recognize the existence
of an element of indeterminism and irreducible contingency in the
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universe. The future is hidden from us—not in the present, but
in the future. Time is the mediator between the possible and the
actual.
Similar elaborations on this view can be found in Eddington (1949) and
(1953). The doctrine that the objectivity of the distinction between the
past, the present, and the future requires indeterminism (or some aspect
of contingency, or a failure of the universal causation) has been vigorously
opposed.6 But, strangely enough, no friends or foes of the doctrine have
belaboured the underlying association between future and contingency to a
point of stating it with a rigor that would make the association amenable to
formal treatment. It is exactly this task to which we now turn.
How then is the future different from the past and the present? Suppos-
edly, in contrast to the latter, the future has some aspect of contingency. Yet
what is this aspect, exactly? Note that once we decide on how to respond
to this question, we will get a grip on a concept of the future, from which a
characterization of the past and the present would fall in naturally. We will
define events in the past of event e as those events from which perspective e
was in the future. Having had the notions of “events in the past of e” and
“events in the future of e”, we will declare that events co-present with e are
exactly those events that are neither in the past nor in the future of e.
In the above elucidation of what the past is we used tenses (“was in the
future”); similarly we will invariably use words like “after” or “before” in our
final definition of the past, the present, and the future. This might bring in
an objection that our definition is circular. Clarifying this possible confusion,
we assume here a pre-causal ordering of the totality of possible point events,
and that this ordering is partial. The ordering is similar to the SR ordering
in terms of light cones, but generalized to modal contexts. We will read the
ordering e 6 e′ as “e can causally influence e′”, or “e′ belongs to a possible
continuation of e”. The ‘after” and “before” will refer to this ordering. In
a similar vein, the tense operators will be standardly defined in terms of
pre-causal ordering. As a consequence of this approach, we will get a certain
separation between causal notions (including the tense operators) and the
notions of past, present, and future.7
Turning to belabouring on a future–contingency link, let us begin with
the question: why does my toast at the New Year’s Eve 2012 belong to the
future of my present utterance? As a first approximation, take the answer
“It belongs to the future only if it might fail to occur.”
Evidently, this answer is too strong, as it relegates from the future of e any
event that occurs after e in every possible continuation of e. In other words,
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an event deterministic from the perspective of e cannot belong to the future
of e on this construal. As an improvement consider this:
“My toast at the New Year’s Eve 2012 belongs to the future of my present
utterance only if the way it will occur is not settled yet”.
On this proposal, the toast in question belongs to the future of my present
utterance since, for instance, it is not yet settled where I will have it. This
answer is again too strong, for exactly the same reason as the previous one.
What seems to me a minimal link between future and contingency is the
following formulation:
“My toast at the New Year’s Eve 2012 belongs to the future of my present
utterance iff the toast is consistent with the utterance and before the
toast there is an event and some aspect of it that is not settled yet.”8
Here “before” is understood weakly, as “before or identical to”. The require-
ment of consistency excludes from the future of our utterance those possible
events that do not occur in a history to which our utterance belongs. To
illustrate this analysis, although it is inevitable that my old-fashioned me-
chanical wall-clock will strike in 52 minutes, this event belongs to the future
of my present utterance, because there are some events before it that are in
some respect contingent from the present perspective.
The New Year’s Eve examples suggest that the future-contingency link
should be minimal, which strongly favors our third analysis. There seems to
be, however, an opposite intuition as well, which takes the event of our clock
striking in 52 minutes as not really belonging to the future, since (given our
assumptions) it is already settled that the clock will strike in 52 minutes.
The feeling is that the clock mechanism is somewhat “isolated” from its
surrounding, and especially from chancy events in its past. No matter what,
it will strike. On reflection, the truth of the “already settled” sentence above
means that, even if there are many histories to which my utterance belongs,
in every such a history there is our clock striking in 52 minutes. There
is thus a disjunctive event of our clock striking that is contained in many
histories. Lewis calls such events “non-fragile” since, even if our clock stroke
a bit differently, we would call it “the same event as the actual striking of our
clock”. There is however another concept of events, fragile or non-disjunctive
events. On this concept of events, if our clock’s striking were minimally
different from the actual one, even by merely having a minimally different
past, this event would not count as identical with the actual striking. The
feeling of a mechanism isolated from a neighboring chancy event stems from
our concentration on settled truth and the underlying disjunctive events. At
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the level of non-disjunctive events, the phenomenon is absent: a slight chancy
event brings in a non-erasable difference for the future.9
To further elaborate on our third analysis, we will put it down in words
as below:
Condition 1 f is in the future of e iff e is consistent with f and there is
some event e′ before or identical to f and a subject matter A such that at e
it is contingent that A at the space-time location of e′.
To put rigour into our intuition, we need to combine spacetime with
modality. The only rigorous framework for this task is the theory of branching
space-times (BST) of Belnap (1992), which in turn is a development of an
earlier theory of branching time (BT).10 The development consists of the fact
that BST is able to account for spatial and relativistic aspects in addition to
modal and temporal aspects analyzed in BT.
Both branching theories can be seen as addressing two problems. One is
an ontological question: what does the indeterministic world look like? The
other problem is semantic, namely, how to formally model a language with
tenses, modal operators and indexicals? It is BST’s capacity to handle the
second (semantic) problem that we need in the present paper. The basic
insight of branching theorists, owed to Prior, is that sentences are evaluated
as true or false at the event-history pairs, which leads to giving more structure
to evaluation points. Designating evaluation point by e/h, we will have, for
a sentence A unsettled in the future of e:
e/h1 |= Will : A but e/h2 |6= Will : A.
1.1 Models of BST
A model of BST, 〈W,6〉, is a non-empty partially ordered set of possible
point events ordered by a pre-causal relation, subject to some postulates.11
Histories in 〈W,6〉 are identified with particular (upward directed) subsets
of W .
A BST model 〈W,6〉 can serve as a basis of a semantic model 〈〈W,6〉, I〉
for a propositional language with tenses and modal operators, and the in-
dexical “here-and-now”. Above I is an interpretation function I : Atoms⇒
P(W ), where Atoms is the set of atomic formulas. It is understood that
atomic formulas of this language have the form: “Here-and-now there is prop-
erty A”. Turning to truth-conditions, here are a few examples: (For more
information on BST semantical models, cf. Belnap (2007), Mu¨ller (2002),
and Placek and Mu¨ller (2007).) To avoid lengthy notation, we abbreviate
the point of evaluation 〈〈〈W,6〉, I〉, e/h〉 to e/h.
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e/h |= A iff e ∈ I(A) for A an atomic formula;
e/h |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that 〈〈W,6〉, I〉, e/h |= ϕ;
e/h |= Will : ϕ iff ∃e′ > e : e′/h |= ϕ;
e/h |= Was : ϕ iff ∃e′ < e : e′/h |= ϕ;
e/h |= Poss : ϕ iff ∃h′ : e ∈ h′ ∧ e/h′ |= ϕ.
Note that in the last clause, since we quantify over histories on its right-hand
side, the reference to history on the left-hand side is redundant. We will thus
write e |= Poss : A instead of e/h |= Poss : A.
Some (but not all) BST models allow for more structure, as one can define
spacetime locations (st-locations for short) on them. A set Loc of st-locations
for BST model 〈W,6〉 is a partition of W that is conservative with respect
to ordering 6—cf. Mu¨ller (2005). St-location is a relativistic counterpart of
our everyday thinking of what would happen at the time or in the location
of a given event, if things went differently at some junction in the past. Note
that we have thus arrived at the distinction between event (i.e., an element
of W ) and st-location of an event (an element of a particular partition Loc
of W ). To denote the st-location of event e, we will write loc(e).
In what follows, we need to consider sentences of the form “At st-location
x it is ϕ”, like “The value of electromagnetic field at t, x, y, z is such-and-
such.” The truth conditions for such sentences can only be formulated with
respect to a BST model with set Loc of st-locations:
〈〈W,6, Loc〉, I〉, e/h |= Atx : ϕ iff ∃e′ : e′ ∈ h∩ x∧ e′/h |= ϕ, where x ∈ Loc.
We are now able to formulate the intuition of Condition 1 within the language
of BST:
Definition 2 An event f belongs to the future of event e, f ∈ Future(e), iff
there is event e′ and an atomic formula A such that
1. there is history h such that e, f ∈ h and
2. e′ 6 f and
3. e |= Poss : Atloc(e′) : A and
4. e |= Poss : Atloc(e′) : ¬A.
Event p belongs to the past of event e, p ∈ Past(e), iff event e belongs to the
future of p.
Event e′ belongs to the present of event e, e′ ∈ Present(e), iff there is a history
h such that e, e′ ∈ h and e′ belongs neither to the past nor to the future of e.
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The future, present and past as defined above are global, that is, whether an
event belongs to the past / present / future of event e depends on possibilities
open in a history to which e belongs. Technically speaking, clauses (3) and
(4) of the definition of the future of e require quantification over all histories
comprising e. L. Wron´ski suggested to me (in a private communication) that
for some purposes relativised notions of the past / present / future are more
adequate. Typically we do not know about all possibilities available from
a given history. We might thus want to relativise the investigated notions
to some set of possibilities, those we know or those that are available in our
vicinity. Technically, this proposal amounts to relativising the operator Poss
to a set H of histories:
for H ⊆ {h ∈ Hist | e ∈ h}, e |= PossHϕ iff ∃h h ∈ H ∧ e/h |= ϕ.
As a result of replacing Poss by the relativised operator PossH in Defini-
tion 2, typically the future of e as well as the past of e would become smaller,
making the present of e larger.
1.2 Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS)
Although the above definition adequately (we believe) captures our informal
statement of Condition 1, it does not permit us to “see” what the future,
and hence the past and the present, of an event are. This is a consequence
of the generality of BST, which leaves it open what structure BST histories
have, as long as they are maximal upward directed subsets of a base set.
Thus, to address the “see” question, we need to make it relative to a specific
concept of spacetime, and then consider such BST models, in which histories
are isomorphic to the spacetime in question. We will investigate the problem
for Minkowski spacetime.
A particular class of BST models, in which every history is isomorphic to
Minkowski spacetime has been investigated by Mu¨ller (2002), Wron´ski and
Placek (2009), and Belnap and Placek (2010). To begin with an informal
notion (to be proved identical to BST histories), a possible scenario can be
thought of as Minkowski spacetime plus physical content. The content can
be represented by an attribution of “point properties” (typically, strengths of
physical fields), i.e., a function from <4 to P(P ), where P is the set of point
properties. To get a modal aspect12, we need a system of such “physical
contents”. A system of this sort is represented by a property attribution
F : <4 × Σ→ P(P ), where Σ is the set of labels for scenarios.
Since we haven’t (yet) imposed any restrictions on property attribution
functions, we should expect that they will produce strange property attribu-
tions, or at least, ones incapable of obtaining a BST reading. Thus, in an
attempt to arrive at BST models, we single out the class of “proper” property
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attributions.
We shall put our requirement informally first: for F to be a proper prop-
erty attribution, we require that every two scenarios σ, η ∈ Σ are qualitatively
different somewhere and if they are different at some point, there is a special
point c ∈ <4 below it (called splitting point for σ and η). Its special character
consists in that (1) σ and η agree at and below c, and that (2) for a point x
above c, no matter how close x is to c, there is always an even closer point
above c at which σ and η disagree in content.13 Note that while postulating a
complete qualitative agreement at and below c, we do not require a complete
disagreement above c; we readily permit that over large regions above c the
scenarios are qualitatively the same– as long as they are different at locations
arbitrarily close to c and above c. The locutions “above” and “below” refer
here to the so-called Minkowskian ordering 6M of <4:
x 6M y iff
3∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 6 (x0 − y0)2 and x0 6 y0, (1)
with a resulting strict ordering <M defined in a usual way. The relation of
being space-like related (SLR) is also typically defined: two points are SLR
iff they are incomparable by 6M . Putting the above informal explanation in
symbols, we have this :
Definition 3 A property attribution F : <4 × Σ → P(P ) is proper iff for
every σ, η ∈ Σ (σ 6= η) there is x ∈ <4 such that
F (x, σ) 6= F (x, η), and (2)
(for every x ∈ <4) if F (x, σ) 6= F (x, η), then there is c ∈ <4 such that c <M x
and
∀z ∈ <4(z 6M c→ F (z, σ) = F (z, η)) and (3)
∀x′ ∈ <4(c <M x′ → ∃y ∈ <4(c <M y <M x′ ∧ F (y, σ) 6= F (y, η))). (4)
Points of <4 that satisfy conditions 3–4 constitute what we call the set Sση
of splitting points for σ and η. From this definition of proper property
attribution some desired properties of sets of splitting points are deducible.14
To state them, it is useful to distinguish special subsets of <4, thought of as
regions of no qualitative difference of histories, and defined as
Rση := {x ∈ <4 | ¬∃c (c <M x ∧ c ∈ Sση) for σ, η ∈ Σ.
Fact 4 Assume that F : <4 × Σ → P(P ) is a proper property attribution.
Then:
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1. σ 6= η → Sση 6= ∅;
2. Sση = Sησ;
3. ∀c, c′ ∈ Sση (c 6= c′ → c SLR c′);
4. x ∈ Rση → F (x, σ) = F (x, η); and
5. ∀σ, η, γ ∈ Σ Rση ∩Rηγ ⊆ Rσγ.
Clearly, Σ is not a set of BST histories, and 6M is not a BST ordering.
To produce a BST model, we need to construct these latter notions, showing
that they satisfy BST postulates. In this task, we follow Mu¨ller’s (2002)
construction, to which the reader should turn to for more information. First,
we define relation ≡ on <4 × Σ:15
xσ≡yη iff x=y and x ∈Rση.
Provably ≡ is an equivalence relation on <4×Σ. Next, we define a BST event
as an equivalence class with respect to ≡, that is
{yη | yη ≡ xσ} := [xσ]
A BST ordering is defined as follows:
[xσ] 6 [yη] iff [xσ] = [xη] ∧ x 6M y.
Importantly, it turns out that Σ is indeed a set of labels for histories, as every
BST history is of the form: {[xσ] | x ∈ <4} for σ ∈ Σ. Moreover, given that
a property attribution is proper and an additional postulate is satisfied,16
[xσ] is a maximal element in the overlap of two histories {[xσ] | x ∈ <4} and
{[xη] | x ∈ <4} iff x is a splitting point for these histories, i.e., x ∈ Sση. The
construction should finish with proofs that the resulting structure is indeed
a BST model.17
Figure 1 illustrates two Minkowskian Branching Structures, first with two
histories and one splitting point, and the second —with four histories and two
splitting points. The shaded area indicates where a given history overlaps
with the first history.
Formally speaking, an MBS is a triple 〈Σ, P, F 〉, where Σ is a set of
labels for scenarios, P is a set of point properties, and F is a proper property
attribution. A merit of this construction is that 〈Σ, P, F 〉 provides a natural
semantic model for a propositional language with tense operators and modal
operators, and whose atomic sentences have the form:
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Figure 1: Top: an MBS with one splitting point and two histories. Bot-
tom: an MBS with two splitting points and four histories. Shadowed regions
indicate the intersection of a given history with a reference history σ.
It is ψ here-and-now,
where ψ ∈ P . Furthermore, the proper property attribution F determines
interpretation function I in the following manner:
[xσ] ∈ I(A) iff ψ ∈ F (x, σ), where A =“It is ψ here-and-now”.
The BT/BST truth conditions for tense and modal operators can be readily
reformulated in the MBS framework. For a point of evaluation we take
〈〈Σ, P, F 〉, [xσ]/σ〉, which we abbreviate as [xσ]/σ. As an example, here are
the truth conditions for Poss and Aty (y ∈ R4):
[xσ]/σ|=Poss :B iff there is η∈Σ such that [xσ]=[xη] and [xσ]/η |=B
[xσ]/σ |= AtyB iff [yσ]/σ |= B, where y ∈ R4.
(5)
Since in the clause for Poss the reference to label σ after the stroke is re-
dundant, we will write [xσ] |= Poss : B for [xσ]/σ |= Poss : B.
2 What do the presents look like?
We will now apply Definition 2 to some selected MBS’s in order to get a
grasp on what the future, the present and the past of a given event are.
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Figure 2: The past, the present, and the future of e = [xσ].
Two splitting points, time-like. Consider first an MBS with three his-
tories, i.e. Σ = {σ, η, τ}, in which the proper property attribution yields
two splitting points c1, c2 ∈ R4 such that c2 <M c1 and Sση = {c1} and
Sστ = Sητ = {c2} (See Figure 2.). Pick now an event e := [xσ] that is “be-
tween” c2 and c1 in the sense that c2 <M x 6>M c1 and ask: (1) What is the
future of e? (2) What is its past? (3) And what is its present?
We claim now: For x such that c2 <M x 6>M c1,
1. The future of e = [xσ] is the set of events that are strictly above [c1σ]:
Future([xσ]) = {[zγ] | c1 <M z ∧ γ ∈ {σ, η}}.
2. The past of e = [xσ] is the set of events that are in history σ and not
strictly above [c2σ]: Past([xσ]) = {[zσ] | c2 6<M z}.
3. The present of e = [xσ] is the set of events in history σ and “between”
c2 and c1 in the sense: Present([xσ]) = {[zσ] | c2 <M z ∧ c1 6<M z}.
Proof:
Ad. 1 ⇒ Let [zγ] ∈ Future([xσ]). There is then [z′γ′] such that (†) [z′γ′] <
[zγ] and (‡) [xσ] |= Poss : Atz′A and [xσ] |= Poss:Atz′¬A for some atomic
formula A. It follows that for some β, β′ ∈ Σ: (?) [xσ] = [xβ] = [xβ′], and
[z′β]/β |= A and [z′β′]/β′ |= ¬A. The latter entails () F (z′β) 6= F (z′β′),
and hence β 6= β′. Given the location of x, it follows from (?) that β = σ
and β′ = η (or vice versa), so () implies that c1 <M z′. (†) implies z′ <M z,
and hence c1 <M z. The consistency clause requires γ = η or γ = σ.
⇐ Let c1 <M z. Since c1 ∈ Sση for some z′ such that c1 <M z′ <M z:
F (z′σ) 6= F (z′η). Hence for some atomic A: [z′σ]/σ |= A and [z′η]/η |= ¬A
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Figure 3: History {[xσ] | x ∈ <4} with four splitting points c1, . . . , c4. The
present of event [xσ] is indicated by the shaded area.
(or vice versa). By the location of x, [xσ] = [xη], and hence [xσ] |= Poss :
Atz′A and [xσ] |= Poss : Atz′¬A. Further each [zσ] and [zη] is consistent
with [xσ] (= [xη]) and [z′σ] < [zσ] and [z′η] < [zη].
Ad. 2 By an argument analogous to the one given above, for every z such
that c2 6<M z, [xσ] ∈ Future([zσ]), from which the sought-for result follows.
Ad. 3 Immediate from (2) and (3) above. 
Note that the present of e = [xσ] turns out to be a spatially extended
and temporally thick collection of events. Its temporal thickness depends on
the Lorentz interval of the (time-like) vector c1c2.
Four splitting points, layered in two SLR pairs. Consider an MBS
with five histories, i.e., Σ = {σ, η, τ, ν, γ}, with Sση = {c1}, Sστ = {c2},
Sσν = {c3}, and Sσγ = {c4}. Pick an event [xσ], with x located “between”
two pairs of splitting points, 〈c1, c2〉 and 〈c3, c4〉, each pair being space-like
related and each element of the top pair lying above each element of the
bottom pair—see Figure 3. That is, ∀i=1,2∀k=3,4 ck <M ci and (c3 <M e or
c4 <M e) and (c1 6<M x and c2 6<M x). Applying our Definition 2, we get this
result:
Present([xσ]) = {[yσ] | (y >M c3 ∨ y >M c4) ∧ (y 6>M c1 ∧ y 6>M c2)}.
Thus, the present of [xσ] turns out to have a shape of a thick letter W .
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Extreme cases: no point / every point is a splitting point. Consider
an MBS with history {[xσ] | x ∈ <4} in which no point is a splitting point,
i.e., ∀x ∈ <4 ∀ρ ∈ Σ x 6∈ Sσρ. By Definition 3 of proper property attribution,
the MBS considered consists of exactly one history, that is Σ = {σ}. This is
global determinism. Then for every event, its past as well as its future are
empty, from which it follows that for every event, its present is the entire
history. We thus have a block universe, indeed.
At the other extreme, if a history splits at every point with some other
history, that is, if ∀x ∈ <4 ∃ η ∈Σ x ∈ Sση for some σ ∈ Σ, then for every
event [xσ], its present consists merely of the event itself.
3 Discussion
Taking as a guide an (alleged) link between tenses and modalities, we de-
fined a frame-independent notion of “the present of an event”. The presents
of events can be extended as well as point-like. Importantly, the underlying
relation of co-presence is transitive. The shape of the present of event e oc-
curring in history h depends on the splitting points of h, which are locations
of chancy events in h. These depend in turn on the localization of qualita-
tive differences between h and other histories. The definition allows for a
non-extended present as well as the global cosmic present, that, the entire
universe.
On this construal, the present of e is a set of events, that is, it is an event-
like concept. It is not a location-like concept; consequently, one cannot ask
in this framework what the present of a given spatiotemporal location is?
Observe that two different events sharing the same location must have differ-
ent presents, since they must belong to alternative histories. Further these
two presents, that is, different sets of events, may have different locations, as
chancy events in these alternative histories may have different spatiotemporal
locations.
Finally, according to our definition, there is a full separation of tenses
and causal notions. It might happen that e is in the causal past of f (i.e.,
within the past light-cone of f), but belong to the present of f . In the
other direction, f might lie outside the causal future of e (i.e., e SLR f),
but nevertheless belong to the future of e. This is the price to be paid for
not requiring in Definition 2 that the future of e is (causally) after e. The
definition also allows that for some two events, each belongs to the future of
the other, which further entails that for each event of this kind, its future
overlaps with its past.
There is a straightforward remedy that prohibits this controversial con-
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sequence and removes the separation of tenses and causal notions in one
direction: strengthen the clauses 1 and 2 of Definition 2, with the following
result:
Definition 5 An event f belongs to the future of event e, f ∈ Future(e), iff
there is event e′ and an atomic formula A such that
1. e < e′ 6 f and
2. e |= Poss : Atloc(e′) : A and
3. e |= Poss : Atloc(e′) : ¬A.
Event p belongs to the past of event e, p ∈ Past(e), iff event e belongs to the
future of p.
Event e′ belongs to the present of event e, e′ ∈ Present(e), iff there is a history
h such that e, e′ ∈ h and e′ belongs neither to the past nor to the future of e.
As a result, every event in the future of e will be the causally after e, and
every event in the past of e will be causally before e. In general, this change
of Definition 2 will result in smaller futures and smaller pasts, but larger
presents. In particular, in a Minkowskian Branching Structure, if there are
splitting points arbitrarily close below and arbitrarily close above a given
event e, the future of e is the union of alternative possible future light-cones
of e, its past—the past light-cone of e, and its present in a given history
containing e—the set of events that belong to this history and are space-like
related to e.
Despite the altered definition, some separation of tenses and causal no-
tions remains. To use Aristotle’s sea battle, suppose that the two admirals
have already brought their hostile fleets near our harbor and have decided to
have a battle tomorrow.18 Suppose further that with their decision, and all
the circumstances, no matter what, the battle must happen. And not only
this: assume as well that there is not a single trace of chanciness between
our present thinking and the battle. No quantum decay, no agent’s differing
to do this rather than that. If these conditions are satisfied, the battle is
now; it belongs to the present of your reading these words now. But obvi-
ously the battle is tomorrow, that is, in one day: by the definition of tense
operators (as well as by common sense) we say: “There will be the sea battle
tomorrow”and yet it is also now, presenting us with a clear paradox.
Let us finally reflect on where we arrived. We elaborated on an Aris-
totelian tradition of associating future with contingency, choosing for our
analysis what seems to be a very weak link between these notions. We then
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used a rigorous framework of BST and MBS’s to write down our definitions,
and to see what the past, the present, and the future look like according
to these definitions, if the underlying spacetime is Minkowski.19 But then,
nicely, we hit upon a paradox. Can we tame it or explain it away? Or is this
paradox a reductio of the idea of associating future with contingency? We
leave it for the reader to decide.
Notes
1 I would like to thank the audience at the ESF workshop “Physical and Philosophical
Perspectives on Probability, Explanation and Time” and the audience of my lunch talk
at the Center for Philosophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh in February 2010.
The paper also owes much to the discussions I had with Jacek Wawer and Leszek Wron´ski.
The MNiSW research grant 668/N-RNP-ESF/2010/0 is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Cf. Malament (1977), Dieks (1988), Stein (1991), van Benthem (1991), or Rakic´
(1997). For a present assessment of Putnam’s argument, cf. Dorato (2008).
3 For an example, see Savitt (2000) or Dieks (2006).
4 The construction developed here is in some aspects similar to that of Mu¨ller’s (2006)
and to a model I gave at Logica 2002 (unpublished). Some ideas presented here were born
in discussions I had with T. Mu¨ller in the years 2002-2004. I am very grateful to him for
sharing his insights with me. It seems to me that Fred Muller once held similar views on
loci for the past, present, and future.
5 Cf. Cael I.12: “No capacity relates to being in the past, but always to being in the
present or future.”
6 See e.g., Gale (1963), as it is an attempt to rebut Whitrow’s and Eddington’s argu-
ments.
7 I am indebted to D. Dieks, K. Kishida, and J. Wawer for clarifying the distinction
between a causal ordering and past, present, and future, and for the perception that tense
operators (Will, Was) are defined in terms of the causal ordering, and separated from
notions of past, present, and future, as here analyzed.
8 The word ‘iff’ abbreviates ‘if and only if’.
9 This problem was brought to my attention by Bryan Roberts.
10 BT theory was suggested in S. Kripke’s letter to A. N. Prior (dated September 3,
1958, unpublished), discussed then briefly in Prior (1967) and worked out in Thomason
(1970).
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11 For the postulates, and more information on BST models, see Belnap (1992).
12 As exemplified for instance in saying “It is ϕ at x ∈ <4, but it could be ψ there”.
13 The background of the requirement is the density of 6, which is a BST postulate.
14 We follow here the construction of Belnap and Placek (2010), which is more “physical”
than the others, since it derives BST structures from property attributions. Apart from the
proper property attributions, these authors assume a topological postulate and a condition
on chains of splitting points.
15 To avoid eyestrain, we write xσ rather than 〈x, σ〉.
16 The postulate is: every convergent sequence in a set Sση is convergent to an element
of Sση—cf. Belnap and Placek (2010).
17 For the proofs we refer the reader to Belnap and Placek (2010), or Mu¨ller (2002) and
Wron´ski and Placek (2009).
18 I owe to J. Bogen the perception of how acute the separation between Will and the
future is.
19As pointed out by J. Norton, physics neither exhibits branching structures similar
to those of BST, nor splitting points, nor particular patterns of branching scenarios, the
single exception being perhaps quantum measurement, but (ironically) this we hardly
understand. Accordingly, BST might be not adequate for analyzing time in our physical
world—the objection goes. But, in the present approach we derive the axioms of BST
from the requirement that the attribution of properties to spatiotemporal points be proper,
which is a week and intuitive requirement. (For the details, of the derivation, cf. Belnap
and Placek (2010).) Perhaps physics has not yet grasped our everyday modal notion
of indeterminism, which means that an event may happen, but not necessarily. (This
notion is different from Laplacian indeterminism, elaborated by Montague (1962) and
Lewis (1983)—for more on this, see our paper cited above.) As we said in the introduction,
we bet that our world is indeterministic in the modal sense, and that physics will come to
terms with it. A similar worry is that our analysis cannot be extended to general relativity,
since BST axioms are incompatible with some solutions of this theory. Although we do not
know how resolve this problem generally, some initial results in this direction are reported
in Placek (2009).
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